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A. INTRODUCTION 
The zeitgeist of the 21st century in the field of  investment treaty arbitrations 
comprises a rise in the number of such arbitrations and accompanying observations on 
the unwieldy jurisprudential effects of  such a rise. The international investment 
arbitration community is alive with discussion over these effects, which discussion 
includes an examination of  the value of  prior awards as precedents.' The existing regime 
based on treaty interpretation clearly provides no formal system of precedent and the 
'players' (read: arbitrators) change from dispute to dispute as investmcnt arbitration 
tribunals do not fall within a single, neat judicial hierarchical system. With the number 
of  investor-State disputes and investment arbitration awards increasing, relatively new 
questions (and concerns) over these effects have therefore arisen.2 
Various writers have commented that there is no formal system of  stare decisis (as 
the common law world knows it) in investment treaty dispute settlement. This, it is said, 
creates inconsistencies, incoherence and a lack of certainty (and possibly, even 
legitimacy) in investment arbitration decisions. Searching for the familiar, some have 
argued that a 'de_facto' system of  stare decisis has arisen in this sphere.' Professor August 
F o r  a discussion of various such effects, see for instance the discussions covering various aspects of recent 
developments in international investment arbitration in the recent and provocatively-titled book, "The Backlash 
Against Investment Arbitration", ed. Michael Waibel et. nl., Kluwer Law International, 2010; for an overview of  
the disquiet, see in particular Chapter 20, "Out  of  Order", Luke Peterson. For examples of  discussions over the 
precedent value of investment arbitration decisions, see irfra, footnotes 3, 9, 15 and 16. Certain investment 
arbitration tribunals have in fact made it clear that they do not consider themselves bound in any way to prior 
awards. 
2 For an overview of  the regime of  the 21 st century, see J. Salacuse, "The Emerging Global Regime for 
Investment", (2010) 51 Harv. Int'l L.J. 427. For a discussion of the increasing number of  investment disputes, see 
C. Schreuer, "A Decade of Increasing Awareness of Investment Arbitration and Intensive Activity: An 
Assessment", December 12, 2005, available at: http://www.occd.org/dataoecd/5/54/36055388.pdf. 
S e e  for instance August Reinisch, "The Role of Precedent in ICSID Arbitration", available at: 
http://iuvestrnentarbitration.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user upload/int_beziehungen/Pcrsonal/Publikationen_Reinisch/ 
roleyrecedents_icsid_arbitrationaayb_2008.pdf See also David Schneiderman, "Judicial Politics and International 
Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Convicting Outcomes" (available at: http://works.bepress.com/ 
cgi/vicwcontent.cgi?article=1000�context=david_schneiderman), at the text accompanying footnotes 84-87. 
Numerous other works discuss the role of precedent in investment treaty disputes: see for instance other references 
in Reinisch, above, at footnotes 24 and 27; and A. Tsatsos, "ICSID Jurisprudence: Between Homogeneity and 
Heterogeneity - A Call for Appeal?", March 2009, 6:1 TDM, accessible at: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/oa/articles/ 
rcJUhoqzJnndU/PDF/20k6GhYNPDs.pdf. 
Published in Journal of World Investment & Trade, 2011, 12 (6), 827-853.
DOI: 10.1163/221190011X00328
Reinisch provides an example of such a view of de facto stare decisis. He has argued 
forcefully in favor of  this, citing the following remarks from the ICSm arbitration award 
in AFS v. Argentina:4 
"Indeed, it would be hard to imagine that the many IcsiD tribunals, currently hearing 
factually similar claims against Argentina which are frequently based on similarly worded or 
even identical BIT provisions, should not take into account what earlier decisions have held 
with regard to similar issues. To act otherwise would deprive Icon) dispute settlement of its 
predictability and thus of an important facet of legal uncertainty. One may also expect that 
with the increased use of the ICSID-specific control mechanism of annulment proceedings 
under Article 52(1) of the IcsiD Convention, a body of case-law will emerge similar to what 
happened in the context of W'ro jurisprudencc resulting from decisions of the Appellate 
Body."5 
A more sanguine view is that if inconsistent awards exist, it is to be expected as a 
fact of  life in investment arbitrations. One is reminded by this evolving picture in the 
international investment landscape of the unwieldiness in views and materials faced by 
judges in the 4th to 6th centuries in Europe, which led first to a "Law of Citations" and 
then to codifications, in order to provide a more systematic and reliable set of authorities 
and rules.6 In investment arbitration however, there is no "codifier" of final authority. 
For this reason, this article postulates a view that tends toward the latter, albeit for 
different reasons. Rather than resting on the general view that inconsistencies are a fact 
of life (which they are) - and hence "vivez les differences" - this article suggests that the 
divergences are arising because of deep ideological fault lines on some emerging, 
fundamental issues among arbitrators. So while in a number of issues (perhaps such as in 
some of the benchmarks for "fair and equitable treatment") a set of norms or criteria is 
emerging and has gained some level of  consistency in a majority of investment 
decisions,7 there remain pockets of  division which are not so harmonized or easily 
reconciliable. 
These issues include the over-arching objective of an investment arbitration - 
which translates for instance into a certain view of how broadly or narrowly to interpret 
who is an "investor" or what is an "investment," - as well as the use of a treaty provision 
such as a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause vis-a-vis dispute settlement mechanisms. 
The quest for a precedential framework (even if de facto /  informal) and establishing clear 
lines of authorities akin to what is witnessed in domestic legal systems will not fully work 
given these ideological differences, and the fact that there is no single unifying, final 
adjudicator on which philosophy should prevail. 
4 Decision on Jurisdiction, Icam Case No. Ajm/02/17, April 26, 2005. 
5 Reinisch, supra, footnote 3. The debate on the existence (or lack) of a de jurelde facto precedent system in 
this sphere can also been seen in a series offour articles in the Spring 2010 (Vol. 25 No. 1) issue of the ICSID Review 
-  Foreign Investment Law Journal, from pages 87 to 124. 
fi See Hans Julius Wolff, "Roman Law: An Historical Introduction", (1951) Univ. of  Oklahoma Press, 
pages 159-169. 
S o  as to even warrant statement as a 'rule' in some cases, as has been attempted by Zachary Douglas: see 
infra, footnote 99. 
B. STARE DECISIS � PRECEDENT AND ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD OF INVESTMENT 
I)EC:ISIONS 
i. A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE? 
At one end, one finds views such as those of  Professor Reinisch, noting a lack of  
formal precedent, but that a de facto system of precedent has been evolving, given that a 
number of  arbitral tribunals make reference to prior awards on related subject matter, 
with some even following their paths of reasoning.8 
One also finds, on the other hand, straightforward views such as that of Professor 
Jan Paulsson: that investment tribunals' decisions should not be expected to produce 
binding precedents (a view that is eminently sensible, in this author's opinion).9 In a 
lively and provocative piece contributed to a symposium in 2006, Professor Paulsson 
argued that the sky had not fallen despite the cries of incoherence by some observers; 
obiter dicta in awards should be treated as such, and no more.10 He argues instead in 
favour of  a Darwinian view: 
"So it is pointless to resist the observation that precedents generate nonns of international 
law. It is a fact of life before international courts and tribunals. What is more pertinent is to 
understand that the influence of international awards and judgements - even those 
emanating from the same court - is highly variable.... International courts and tribunals ... 
are not part of a hierarchical system. This may result in some untidiness ... while 
hierarchically undistinguishable, there are awards and awards, some destined to become ever 
brighter beacons, others to flicker and die near-instant deaths. . . .  In practice, [the corpus 
of international investment arbitration cases] will also doubtless turn out to be subject to the 
same Darwinian imperative: the unfit will perish."1 I
However, who is to determine which decisions are 'unfit', and, before such 'unfit' 
decisions and their influence perish for certain, what do policymakers and investors need 
to do? As this article argues, there remain some areas where decisions in ideology 
ri Ibirl. See also C. Schreuer, "Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment 
Arbitration", (2006) 2 TDM, http://www.transnational-dispute-managernent.com/article.asp?key=755 (access by 
subscription); and C. Schreuer and Weiniger, "A Doctrine of 1'rcccdent?", Chapter 30, "The Oxford Handbook 
of  International Investment Law", eds. Muchlinski, Ortino and Schreuer, 2008, Oxford University Press, at pages 
1191-1196, citing in particular remarks by the ICSID tribunal in AFS Corp 1'. Argentina, suprn, footnote 4. 
'' Jan Paulsson, "Avoiding Unintended Consequences" in "Appeals Mechanism in International Investment 
Disputes", Karl P. Sauvant (ed.) with Michael Chiswick-Patterson, 2008, at pages 241 and 246. 
10 [bid., at page 248. He also lamented that the "reality of investment arbitration is that the quality of advocacy 
varies greatly from case to case" and this in turn means that pleadings and arguments may turn out to be mediocre 
in some cases. An annulment committee (in the Icsn> context) may find itself faced with "artless pleadings", and 
that "[arbitrators do not answer exam questions tidily articulated by the finest academics; they decide cases as they 
arc presented, whatever the imperfections of the pleadings and the spottiness of the factual record." Mr Paulsson 
further describes the evolution of cases in investment treaty arbitration as a "Darwinian struggle": Paulsson, 
"International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International Law", IcC:n 
Congress Series No. 13, International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics?", ed. A.J. van den Berg, Kluwer, 2007, 
cited in Lucy Reed, "The De Facto Precedent Regime in Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive Case 
Management", 95-103, at pages 96 and 99. Indeed, Ms Reed herself prefers to describe the situation as a 
"primordial soup, which we watch being stirred as some awards rise to the top and others fill to the bottom." (At 
page 99). 
11 Jan Paulsson, "International Arbitration and the Generation of  Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and 
International Law", in Albert van den Berg (ed.), "International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics?", ICCA Congress 
Series, (2007) Kluwer Law International, 879-9, at page 881. 
regarding the purpose and interpretation of  certain investment treaty provisions may 
pose an obstacle to such an evolutionary approach. 
Yet others have argued that, apart from a common law doctrine of  precedent, the 
'counterpart' notion in civil law jurisdictions may be apposite. Professor Andrea K. 
Bjorklund, for instance, argues: 
"The informal and dispersed regime of investment treaty arbitrations is not well suited to 
developing a system of formal precedent. Eventually, however, an accretion of decisions 
will likely develop a jurispmdence constante - a 'persisting jurisprudence' that secures 
'unification and stability of judicial a c t i v i t y  
In place of  seeking a system of precedent, Professor Bjorklund prefers to transpose 
the French civil law notion of jurisprudence constante, which he finds to provide "an 
appealing analogy" .13 The analogy is based on three factors: first, the text is the starting 
point (Code in French law, treaty in investment arbitration); secondly, one o f  the 
reasons for reference to precedent under French law is similar to that for an investment 
tribunal to look at other awards: to seek either a positive or negative example in a lower 
court's decision (which is clearly non-binding, as opposed to that of  a higher court 
which, though not binding, "for practical purposes ought to be followed").14 Finally, 
the analogy applies because case law leads to an "accretion of a consistent line of  cases, 
rather than the establishment of a rule by an individual case" (which he likens to the 
formation of customary international law).15 However, Professor Bjorklund recognizes 
that this is an imperfect analogy. Again, as this article argues, the depth of ideological 
division in certain areas may militate against such an easy solution as divining a 
meaningful jnrisprudence constante. 
i i .  A  ` L I N E  O F  C A S E S ' ?  
One difficulty - even if  one accepted this analogy, as recognized by Professor 
Bjorklund - is that the above view of precedent still draws from cases within a common 
legal order or system. The analogy could work well, for instance, in the WTO, in which 
12 Andrea Bjorklund, "Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Callsta/lte", (2010) TDM 7:1, 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319834�. For a comparison of legal approaches 
to precedents, see generally, "Interpreting Precedents", eds. MacCormick and Summers, 1997, Ashgate/ 
Dartmouth. 
"  Ibid., page 272. This analogy has some support: see Joseph M. Boddicker, "Whose Dictionary Controls? 
Recent Challenges to the Term "Investment" in ICSID Arbitration", (2010) Am. U. Int. L. Rev., 1033. See also 
generally, Paolo Vargiu, "Beyond Hallmarks and Formal Requirements: A 'Jurisprudence Constante' on the 
Notion of Investment in the ICSID Convention", (2009) 10 J. World Inv. � Trade 753 (cited by Boddicker). 
r4 Bjorklund, supra, footnote 12. 
r5 Ibid., page 273. The analogy finds some basis too in the approach seen in some civil law systems which, 
over time, identify a "line of  cases" on a legal issue notwithstanding a lack of a formal system of precedent as is 
known in common law. For a discussion on various civil law systems, including those with such an approach, see 
"Interpreting Precedents - A Comparative Study", ed. MacComuck and Summers, supra, footnote 12. For a 
comparison with Louisiana law which presents another version ofcivil law, see Mary Garvey Algero, "The Sources 
of  Law and the Value of  Precedent: A Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law 
Nation", (2004-5) La L Rev 775 (cited in Bjorklund, supra, footnote 12.) The view that such 'lines of consistent 
cases' is also taken by G. Kaufrnann-Kohler, "Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?", 2006 Freshfields 
lecture, (2007) Arb. Int'l 23:3, 357 (cited by Bjorklund). 
panels and the Appellate Body form part of the same, special legal system. In the case of  
investment arbitration, each award stands on its own in the sense that they do not 
emanate from a legal hierarchy or necessarily even a common legal order. As has been 
o b s e r v e d ,  " [ e ] a c h  t r i b u n a l  is c o n s t i t u t e d  a d  h o c  f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e " . 1 6  E v e n  I C S I D  
arbitral tribunals, although organized under the auspices of ICSID, derive their authority 
from the consent given by the parties in question. A fortiori, an ad hoc arbitral tribunal 
applying the UNCITRAL (or other non-institutional) arbitral rules would not even fall 
within this institutional umbrella. 
Secondly, i f  one were to argue that the parisprudence constante analogy may be 
applied, then when would one know that such a "line of precedents" has been 
established? The answer is not uniform even within the civil law universe, nor in the 
realm of  customary international law (which requires proof of an attitude of opinio juris 
and some undefined quantum of  state practice before a rule is found to have been 
formed). Some may be content to leave this an open question, as long as the analogy 
can be drawn with some familiar existing notion. 
Even within this analogy, there is not always consensus as to the lines of precedents. 
On  the evolving case law on the meaning of  "investment" for instance, while some like 
Vargiu argue in favor of a jurisprudence constante, others such as Professor Rudolph Dolzer 
have pointed out that there are in fact three "lines" of approaches in this m a t t e r  
The strenuous efforts to find a familiar model from domestic legal systems, (perhaps 
partly for, to borrow a phrase, "intellectual comfort"18) to apply to investment 
arbitration awards may be akin to trying to fit the proverbial square peg into a round 
hole; it just docs not fit. The arbitral awards constellation may well be sui generis.19 As 
Mr Paulsson has said, "That a special jurisprudence is developing from the leading 
awards in the domain of investment arbitration can only be denied by those determined 
to close their eyes. "20 It should be noted, too, that in the context of  the ICSID annulment 
process, a desire to see development o f  a jurisprudence constante in annulment decisions 
has been articulated. For instance, the Annulment Committee in Enron v. Argentina 
made the following remarks, immediately after stating that an annulment committee is 
not a court of appeal: 
"Although there is no doctrine of binding precedent in the ICSID arbitration system, the 
16 C. Schreuer, "Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration", supra, 
footnote 8. 
17 R. Doizer, "The Notion ot Investment in Recent Practice", chapter 19 in Charnovitz, Steger, Van den Bossche 
(eds.), "Law in the Service of Human Dignity: Essay in Honour of  Florentino Fcliciano", (2005), Cambridge 
University Press (cited in Paulsson, supra, footnote 11). Professor Dolzer's chapter concludes with these telling 
remarks: "In the future, the weight and acceptance of these three approaches will presumably be assessed not just in 
the context of the term 'investment'. The interpretation of such general clauses as 'fair and equitable' or 'full 
protection and security' will also depend on which of the three modes of interpretation will gain acceptance. At this 
moment, the diversity of reasoning oj the tribunals makes it difficult to predict the direction of future jurisprudence." (At page 275). 
18 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra, footnote 1 S, at page 359. (Italics added.) 
r9 Indeed, the investment treaty 'rcgime' has been said to "have significant differences from other 
international regimes"; Salacuse, supra, footnote 2, at pages 463-7. 
211 Jan Paulsson, supra, footnote 11, at page 887. 
Committee considers that in the longer term there should develop a jurisprudence constant in relation to 
annulment proceedings."21 (Emphasis added.) 
There appears to be therefore a wish in some quarters to identify with some 
certainty some general principles in investment treaty arbitrations."- 
iii. INTO t h e  POOL? 
Professor Bjorklund's brief comparison of development of  investment rules with 
the development of customary international law is one worth further examination. To 
develop the point further, in a somewhat different direction, one may be tempted to 
argue that awards represent an evolutionary development of  legal interpretations on 
various investment law concepts and principles. With time and continual 
reinforcement, legal "rules" can coalesce and these, in themselves, may even be argued 
to flow eventually into the general pool of customary international law itself.23 This 
author has previously explored this type of reasoning in relation to WTO case law and 
its potential contribution to customary international law.24 
However, W o o  panel and Appellate Body decisions (i.e. reports) are arguably 
accorded endorsement by a large number of states through adoption of  those decisions 
by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body.25 
At the same time, while the International Court ofJustice (Icj) draws its authority 
from states members to the United Nations; its judgements are binding only between 
the disputant states, for that case.26 Nonetheless, states may declare they: 
"recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law; 
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation". 
21 Para. 66 of the Annulment Decision. On the point of jurisprudence collstallle, the Committee also cited in 
agreement in para. 65 the observations of an earlier ad hoc Annulment Committee in the Mci Power Croup LLC v. 
Republir offciiador, ICSID Case No. ARD/03/6, Annulment Decision. 
-= Indeed, one writer has attempted to 'compile' a list of norms in this regard, for discussion and consideration: 
see Zachary Douglas, "The International Law of Investment Claims", Cambridge University Press, 2009 and intra, 
footnote 99. 
z3 This will likely not take the "glacial speed" (according to Paulsson, supra, footnote 11, at page 880) at which 
customary international law develops, given the large number of investment arbitrations and awards we arc 
witnessing. Paulsson adds that the "corpus of  decided cases in international investment arbitration is of  recent 
vintage, but has come into existence with remarkable speed. Its legal status as a source of law is in theory equal to 
that of other types of international courts or tribunals." (Supra, footnote 20, at page 881.) 
24 Hsu, Chapter 21, "Applicability o f W T o  Law in Regional Trade Agreements: Identifying the Links", in 
"Regional Trade Agreements and the W ro", eds. Bartel and Ortino, (2006) Oxford University Press. 
zs The DiB comprises the WTO membership of more than 150 states. 
26 Art. 59, Statute of the Icj states: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect of that particular case." 
On the other hand, investment arbitral awards do not receive such explicit 
endorsement and acceptance by a large body of  states. Hence there is a significant 
difference in perception and reality with respect to such awards, in terms of  state 
acceptance and their ability to represent or evolve into state practice for the purposes of  
creating binding norms. 
Such declarations arguably constitute an endorsement of the ICJ's authority to 
detennine and apply international law in accordance with a-d above. 
Investment arbitration awards, by contrast, receive no subsequent state 
endorsement in the way that WTO decisions do, nor are they subject to declarations by 
states as ICJ judgments do above. States consent to participation in specific, ad hoc dispute 
settlement with investors through their BITS, without necessarily endorsing that such 
tribunals represent their views or practice in international law at large. Arguably 
therefore, such tribunals (which arc obviously not themselves states) lack standing to 
"make" customary international law binding on states. 
A further question arises under this analogy: what i f  two (or more) separate lines of  
decisions of  equal force and number emerge? An example of such a situation is the issue 
of  applicability of  a MFN provision in a BIT to dispute settlement. That there has been 
development of two parallel tracks of  opinions, one more open to the application of the 
clause to dispute settlement, the other clearly much more hesitant to do so (if not against 
it), challenges the argument that jurisprudence constante has emerged in this area, or could 
in the near future. The possibility of  a dual/multi-track development of  cases was 
recognized in Wititershall.27 
The tribunal there stated: 
"177. To adopt the words of the UN Secretary-General in his 1949 Memorandum "the 
divergent interpretations of the most favoured rtation Clause" which caused difficulties then, continue 
to cause difficulties, even nou�! In a wide variety of cases, arbitral tribunals (Icstt� and other) 
have been called upon to interpret an MFN Clause in a t3iT to determine whether or not it 
extends to dispute-resolution, (a jurisdiction clause). Their decisions have been neither 
uniform nor consistent; different tribunals faced with differently worded treaties (sometimes 
even similarly worded treaties) have reached different, if not conflicting, conclusions. In the 
sphere ofMFN Clauses (in B1'rs) and their reach, adjudications by ad hoc tribunals' have proved 
to be an obstade to the development of a jurisprudence constante. Under the ICSID system, there is 
no mechanism for promoting certainty and predictability. But this does not mean that 
decisions of tribunals (Icsm or other) are not cited by parties before an arbitration tribunal 
in a particular case. As a matter of fact, in this very case each side has relied on a plethora of 
decisions - of course, none of them binding, on the Tribunal. But the decisions do warrant 
examination." (Emphasis added. Original footnotes omitted.)2" 
The tribunal further described the situation in this area as follows: "In a welter of  
inconsistent and confusing dicta of different tribunals, ("case-law") the conclusion set 
21 Wintershall Aktiengesetisdiaft v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. An.B/04/14. Award, November 8, 2008. See 
especially paras. 179-184 of the Award. 
=H Para. 177 of the Award. 
out [in a 2008 publication preferring the 1'lama line of cases, and concluding that 
'investment treaties' dispute settlement provisions, save where the States expressly so 
p r o v i d e ]  d o e s  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  t h e  m e r i t  o f  c l a r i t y  a n d  c o n s i s t e n c y .  " 2 9  
The search for a 'jurisprudence. constante' in this area clearly produces two 'lines of 
cases', each with a credible and more than negligible following - adding no certainty. 
A 'split' in lines of cases is recognized.3!' 
If one concludes that neither finding a de,facto system of stare decisis or analogizing 
to jurisprudence constante is satisfactory, it is perhaps more fruitful to focus on where 
ideological fault lines are in specific areas, to understand how policy and treaty makers, 
investors and arbitrators might act according to this knowledge. This is not to say that 
one does not recognize customary treaty interpretation rules that apply; however, 
differing idealogies can intervene where treaty language is unclear, or leaves the door 
open to such deep differences making their appearance. Instead of viewing the situation 
as one of incoherence and with consternation, this approach could lend some measure 
of  stability with the recognition of such fault lines. Difficult issues may not be resolved 
in a matter of a dozen or so cases as the debate may take time to mature and reach - if 
possible - any consensus. Indeed, adopting a "dynamic" view, some authors have 
expressed: 
"Civil law doctrines of precedent require varying degrees of consistency in past case law. 
Consistent decision making does not necessarily imply efficiency and the social value of 
consistency may vary over time and under different circumstances. Certain aspects of 
contemporary law may have stabilized, while others are in a state of flux. For more 
traditional legal issues consistency may be desirable to promote certainty and facilitate the 
formation of parties' legal expectations. For new legal issues and in the presence of volatile 
environments, requiring consistency may be detrimental, inasmuch as it precludes 
experimentation with diverse legal solutions, offering the possibility to tailor legal rules to 
changing circumstances over time."31 
There is therefore room for a divergence in opinions in these 'pockets' of  issues, as 
long as states and investors continue to consent to submit their disputes to decision- 
makers who hold these opinions. Where states and investors no longer so consent, they 
may respectively, amend or exit their treaties, and not bring investor claims before such 
tribunals. As for the investment arbitration system as a whole: just because the child has 
begun to display some unpleasing features, does not detract from the fact that the child 
was conceived through consent. 
29 Para. 189 of  the Award. 
31) For an interesting law and economics approach, see Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi, "Judicial precedents 
in civil law systems: A dynamic analysis" December 2006, International Review of  Law and Economics, 26:4, 
519-535 (available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL�_udi=B6V7M-4MYMFWO- 
4�- user= 1 047253�- coverDate= 12%2F31 %2F2006� Jdoc= 1 � Jmt= high� - orig=search� - origin=search� _sort 
=d�_docanchor=�view=c� searchStrId=1550535034�_rerunOrigin=googte�_acct=C0000509t9�_vcrsion= 
1�_urlVersion=0�_userid=1047253�md5=f56639a2cf78b236afbb63da52657144�searchtype=a); on the authors' 
approach to 'split' case law, see pages 520, 522, 52 and 528-531. Interestingly, in a statement that appears to support 
the significance of  ideological differences highlighted in this article, the authors state in their conclusion: "Past 
decisions are affected by parties' case selection and pedges' ideological preferences." (At page 533, italics added.) 
31 Fon and Parisi, ibid. 
C. THE PROXY UNMASKED - IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES 
i. DODGINC; THE BRICKBATS 
M r  Paulsson has character ized the issue as o n e  o f  a t tacking the  process: 
"Some questions are eternal.. . .  Looking backward, it is plain that no national system has 
reached the promised land of  the Answer. Incoherence abounds... .  So let us not beat about 
the bush. W h e n  critics of  international arbitration bemoan the lack of  consistency and 
coherence, they are blaming the process for failing to achieve the impossible -  and 
proposing solutions which would fare no better. Once again, the hidden agenda needs to 
come out: what is being questioned is the very concept of  neutral international adjudication 
and its necessary constraint on sovereignty. Adjudication of matters of  public law is 
everywhere a constraint on collective sovereignty. Such is its nature and function. "32 
A n  illustration o f  a v i e w  that quest ions the  potent ia l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  i nves tmen t  
arbitrators and  the  process itself o f  hav ing  such tr ibunals adjudge matters  raising public  
interest  issues can be  seen in the  words  o f  Professor Gus  Van  Har t en ,  c o m m e n t i n g  o n  
the  o n g o i n g  arbi t ra t ion based on  the D o m i n i c a n  R e p u b l i c - C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a - U n i t e d  
States Free T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  ("CAFTA"), in PacRitti v. El  Salvadore: 
"First, under CAFTA and other investment treaties, the constraints put on governments are 
both exceptionally potent and highly malleable. This makes it very important, and yet very 
difficult, to assess the legal standards that will apply in particular cases. In numerous awards 
to date, tribunals have interpreted provisions on expropriation, national treatment and fair 
and equitable treatment in starkly divergent ways. In turn, they have fueled high-stakes 
uncertainty in the evaluation of policy space and litigation risk. 
Second, investment treaties rely on the remedy of  damages in cases often stemming from 
difficult judgment  calls by governments in complex areas of  policy. This can put arbitrators 
in a bind. Do they order a state to pay damages after finding that it violated an unclear rule? 
O r  do they dismiss the claim, leaving the investor reeling after a long, expensive arbitration? 
Compared to other forms o f  public law judging, the system gives few options to respond to 
government conduct that is characterized, well after the fact, as unlawful. 
Third, the use o f  arbitrators instead of judges to decide basic tensions in public policy makes 
it essential that the process be credible and independent. However,  investment treaty 
arbitration lacks key safeguards of  independence that apply to courts, including security of  
tenure, an objective method of assigning judges to specific cases, and checks on income- 
earning activities outside of  the judicial role. 
This invites unsavoury questions. What  are the business interests of  the arbitrators chosen 
to decide a case? With whom might they have a common outlook at the International 
Chamber o f  Commerce,  ICSID and others that wield key powers over arbitrator 
appointments? By allowing the arbitration industry to make final decisions in matters of  
public law, investment treaties remove longstanding safeguards that protect judges from 
e c o n o m i c  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  e n t a n g l e m e n t  a n d  t h a t  e n s u r e  p u b l i c  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  c o u r t s . . . .  " 3 3  
32 Supra, footnote 9, at pages 244-5. 
c\3 Gus Van Harten, "Thinking Twice about a Gold Rush: Pacific Rim v. El Salvador", Columbia Fm 
Perspectives, http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/thinking-twice-about-gold-rush-pacific-rim-v-cl- Salvador, 
No. 23, May 24, 2010, quotation reprinted with permission from the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Intemational Investment (www.vcc.columbia.edu). A rigorous response to Prof Van Harten's piece, by 
Alexandre de Graumont (counsel for PacRim), "Mining for facts: PacRim Cayman Llc  v. El Salvador", No. 29, 
September 8, 2010, may be viewed at: http://www.vcc.colLimbia.edu/coiiteiit/iiiiiiitig-facts-pacriiii-cayniaii-Ec-v- 
In an article that included ICSm arbitral awards and US Supreme Court decisions 
as bases of  analysis, Mr Schneidennan discussed the issue of conflicting investment 
arbitration awards through the lens of  "judicial politics".34 
Deep 'conflicts' of opinion are symptomatic of a divergence in fundamental 
ideology held among arbitrators on the provisions in questions, their interpretations and 
the roles and functions of  investor-State arbitral mechanisms. Four examples are given 
below to illustrate this point. 
11. SOME EXAMPLES 
Each of the issues/cases in the following examples has been extensively reported 
and discussed elsewhere, and the purpose here is to highlight what this author considers 
to be the salient ideological divisions shown by these decisions. 
1. SCOPE OF WHO IS AN "INVESTO1Z" 
The case of Tokio Tokeles v. Ukraine35 serves as a good example of a strong 
ideological difference between the majority and the dissenting arbitrator in determining 
whether the tribunal had jurisdiction on its facts. While there were other jurisdictional 
objections raised, the most divisive was in respect of  nationality of the investor. The 
difference stemmed from divided perceptions of: 
. the object and role of Icaln investor-State arbitrations, and the related issue of 
origin of  capital; and 
. a difference in whether to lift the "corporate veil" in a case of  "round-tripping" 
as some put it (or of a national of  the home state investing in his country by making the 
investment through a vehicle in the other treaty state).36 
The following excerpts, quoted in some detail in order to more fully illustrate the 
fundamental rifts, show a clear division of ideology between the majority and dissenting 
arbitrators. The majority, comprising Messrs Daniel Price and Picro Bernardini, took a 
broad and literal view of whether the investor in question was covered. Looking at the 
Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, they stated: 
"31. The object and purpose of the Treaty likewise confirm that the control-test should not 
el-salvador. On the possible conflicts faced by arbitrators who also increasingly act as counsel elsewhere, a less 
critical view than Van Hanen's is taken by Bjorklund; he recognizes the potential dilemma of such arbitrators and 
that such issues "will require attention..."; supra, footnote 12, at page 279. 
34 See supra, footnote 3. 
;5 Tokio Tokeles v. Ukraine award (Jurisdiction), (2005) 20 ICSID Rev-FiLj2O5 (award dated 29 April 2004). 
•Vt The term "round-tripping" has been used by various writers. See for instance, Geng Xiao, ADB Institute 
Discussion Paper (December 2004), "People's Republic of China's Round-Tripping: Scale, Causes and 
Implications", available at: http://www.adbi.org/discussion-paper/2004/06/01 /450.prc.foreign.direct.investment/, 
and Unc t ad ,  World Investment Report 2006, pages 12 available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf 
Professor Somarajah also refers to "round-tripping" in Sauvant, supra, footnote 9, at pages 53-4, and in 
M. Sornarajah, "The International Law of  Foreign Investment", (2010) Cambridge University Press, at page 328. 
be used to restrict the scope o f  "investors" in Article 1(3)(b). The preamble expresses the 
Contracting Parties' intent to "intensify economic cooperation to the mutual benefit o f  
both States" and "create and maintain favourable conditions for investment of  investors of  
one State in the territory of  the other State".. . .  
32. The object and purpose of  the Treaty are also reflected in the Treaty text. Article 1, 
which sets forth the scope of  the BIT, defines "investor" as "any entity" established in 
Lithuania or Ukraine as well as "any entity" established in third countries that is controlled 
by nationals of  or by entities having their seat in Lithuania or Ukraine. Thus, the 
Respondent's request to restrict the scope of covered investors through a control-test would 
be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty, which is to provide broad 
protection of  investors and their investments.... 
52. . . .  the Claimant is an "investor" of  Lithuania under Article 1(2) (b) of  the BIT because it 
is an "entity established in the territory of  the Republic of  Lithuania in confonnity with its 
laws and regulations." This method of defining corporate nationality is consistent with 
modem BIT practice and satisfies the objective requirements of  Article 25 of  the 
Convention. W e  find no basis in the BIT or the Convention to set aside the Contracting 
Parties' agreed definition of corporate nationality with respect to investors o f  either party in 
favor of  a test based on the nationality of  the controlling shareholders. While some tribunals 
have taken a distinctive approach, (original footnote omitted) we do not believe that 
arbitrators should read in to Brr's limitations not found in the text nor evident from 
negotiating history sources."37 
Fo l lowing  the approach  o f  the  famous Icj  decision ( conce rn ing  d ip lomat ic  
p ro t ec t i on  o f  corpora te  shareholders) ,  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co, Ltd v. 
Spain,3s the major i ty  decl ined to pierce the  corpora te  veil in this case. 
Professor  Prosper  Wei l ,  the  dissenting arbitrator,  o n  the  o the r  hand,  focused  o n  the  
object  of ICSID arbitrations. H e  began  by  expla in ing that: 
"the approach taken by the Tribunal on the issue of  principle raised in this case for the first 
time in ICSID'S history is in my view at odds with the obiect and purpose of the IcsiD Convention 
and might jeopardize the future of the institution. In other words, my dissent does not relate to 
any particular aspect of  this brilliantly drafted Decision, or to any particular assessment of  the 
facts, but rather to what I would call the philosophy of the Decision ...... 39 (Emphasis added.) 
O n  the issue o f  object o f  ICSID arbitrations, he a rgued  passionately as follows: 
"5 . . . .  the ICSID arbitration mechanism is meant for international investment disputes, that is 
to say, for disputes between States and Foreign investors. It is because of  their international 
character, and with a view to stimulating private international investment, that these disputes 
may be settled, if the parties so desire, by an international judicial body. The ICSID mechanism 
is not meant for investment disputes between States and their own nationals.... 
19. It is indisputable, and indeed undisputed, that the object and purpose of  the ICSID 
Convention and, by the same token, of  the procedures therein provided for are not the 
settlement of investment disputes between a State and its own nationals. It is only the international 
investment that the Convention governs, that is to say, an investment implying a 
transborder flux o f  capital. This appears from the Convention itself, in particular from its 
S u p r a ,  footnote 35. 
'R International (:ourt of  Justice judgement, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php? 
pl=3�p2=3�k-1 1 a�case= 50�code=bt2�p3=4�PHPSESSID= 18ce3668954f5d53483ad46a2O4cOcdc. 
3' Supra, footnote 35, dissenting opinion, para. 1. 
Preamble which refers to "the role of private international investment" and, of course, from 
its Article 25. . . .  
The ICSID mechanism and remedy are not meant for investments made in a State by its own 
citizens with domestic capital through the dtannel of afore�qii entity, whether preexistervt or created for 
that purpose. To maintain, as the Decision does, that "the origin of the capital is not relevant" 
and that "the only relevant consideration is whether the Claimant is established under the 
laws of  Lithuania" (original footnote omitted) runs counter to the object and purpose of the whole 
ICSm system.... 
24. This is not a question of extending the control test at the expense of the rule of  the siege 
social. Tltis is simply giving effect to a provision the rationale of which is to grant the protection of the 
ICSID procedures to all genuinely international investments but, by the same token, only to genuinely 
international investments. Insofar as business law and issues of  business liability are involved, 
there is no reason for denying effect to the corporate structure chosen by the economic 
agents. When  it comes to mechanisms and procedures involving States and implying, 
therefore, issues of  public international law, economic and political reality is to prevail over 
legal structure, so much so that the application of  the basic principles and rules of  public 
international law should not be frustrated by legal concepts and rules prevailing in the 
relations between private economic and juridical players. The object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention its not - and its effect, therefore, should not be - to afford domestic, national corporations 
the means of evading the jurisdiction of their domestic, national tribunals.... 
25. The problem... is not a choice between a flexible and realistic attitude or a formalistic 
and rigid attitude with respect to private law relationships between companies of  the same 
group. The problem before the Tribunal involves considerations of international public 
policy and is governed by public international law... .  
Once again, this is not  a question o f  alleging, or sanctioning, any misconduct or fraud of 
either Tokios Tokeles or its subsidiary Taki spravy, or their management. This is only and 
exclusively a questions 4 giving effect to the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention and, if I may 
s a y  so, o f  p rese rv ing  its in tegr i ty . "40  ( E m p h a s i s  a d d e d  e x c e p t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  f o u r  l i n e s . ) " 4 1  
As a result, he v i e w e d  the  origin o f  the investor 's  capital (in this case, largely f r o m  
Ukra in i an  nationals, i.e. nationals o f  the  h o m e  state o f  the  inves tments  in quest ion) as 
be ing  highly  relevant.  H e  was therefore  o f  the  v i ew  that  this was a case mer i t ing  lifting 
o f  the  corpora te  veil, to l o o k  to the  nationalit ies o f  the  ul t imate  suppliers o f  capital to 
the Li thuanian  co rpo ra t ion  w h i c h  o w n e d  the  U k r a i n i a n  c o m p a n y  fo rming  the  basis o f  
inves tment .  
T h e  t w o  views w i th in  this award  illustrate the  k ind  o f  deep  division in th ink ing  
a rgued  in this article; the  language used  by  Professor W e i l  supports  such a view. It is 
n o t e w o r t h y  that there  are o the r  tribunals that  have  p r o c e e d e d  to pierce the  corpora te  
veil. 42 
41� Ibid., paras. 20-21. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See for instance Ts,9 Spectmm de Argentina SA. v. the Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARa/OS/5, award 
Dec 19, 2008; discussed in Rachel Thorn � Jennifer Doucleff, "Disregarding the Corporate Veil and Denial of 
Benefits Clauses: Testing Treaty Language and the Concept of  "Investor", Chapter 1 in "The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration", supra, footnote 1, at pages 17-18. 
2. UMBRELLA CLAUSES 
This  area illustrates ano the r  cleavage o f  op in ions  s t e m m i n g  f rom a difference in  
ideology.  T h e  t w o  main  awards giving rise to this debate  are SGS v. Pakistan and Sc;s v. 
Philippines.'� Professor Re in i sch  summarizes  the  differences well: 
"Investment tribunals may come to different conclusions concerning the same or similar legal 
issues. For instance, in the SGS cases, two ICSID) tribunals diverged in their assessments of, 
inter alia, the meaning of umbrella clauses. While the Scs  v. Pakistan tribunal held that via 
an umbrella clause "breaches of  a contract [are not] automatically elevated to the level o f  
breaches of international law," the Scs  v. Philippines tribunal found that an umbrella clause 
"makes it a breach of  the BIT for the host state to fail to observe binding commitments." A 
number of tribunals have followed the Sgs v. Pakistan approach, while others have endorsed 
the Scs  v. Pliilippities a p p r o a c h  (Original footnotes omitted.) 
W h i l e  there  were  certainly differences in the  language used in the  t w o  BIT 
provisions e x a m i n e d  in these t w o  cases, the  division in views and unde r ly ing  t h ink ing  
appeared  to go b e y o n d  those differences, again, arguably il lustrating the  d iv ided  
ideo logy  (carried into subsequent  cases in b o t h  directions) on  the  legal effects tha t  
umbre l la  clauses should  be a l lowed to have o n  parties' rights and  obligat ions u n d e r  a 
treaty. 
3. MFN CLAUSES AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
T h e  ques t ion  o f  h o w  an MFN clause shou ld  be in te rpre ted  vis-a-vis dispute  
se t t lement  provisions in a BIT cont inues  to  vex. S o m e  have a rgued  that  this area is an 
example  of the "expans ionary  t r end"  in foreign inves tmen t  arbitration.45 T h e  arbi t ra t ion 
giving rise to  this line of  debate  was Emiliv Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain. T h e  
overa rch ing  ph i losophy  o f  the  Maffezini t r ibunal  can be seen f rom the fo l lowing  
excerpts  of  the  award: 
"54. Notwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty containing the clause does not refer 
expressly to dispute settlement as covered by the most favored nation clause, the Tribunal 
considers that there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement arrangements 
are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are also related to the 
protection of rights of traders under treaties of commerce. Consular jurisdiction in the past, 
like other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, were considered essential for the protection 
of rights of  traders and, hence, were regarded not merely as procedural devices but as 
arrangements designed to better protect the rights of  such persons abroad. It follows that 
such arrangements, even if not strictly a part of  the material aspect o f  the trade and 
investment policy pursued by treaties of commerce and navigation, were essential for the 
adequate protection of the rights they sought to guarantee. 
a3 Respectively, ICSID Case No. AM/03/11, 1, Deeision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, August 6, 
2003, and Icsid Case No. ARS/02/06, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction , January 29, 2004. 
aa A. Reinisch, Chapter 5, "The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions", in "The 
Backlash Against Investment Arbitration", supra, footnote 1, at pages 115-6. Note that in Scs v. Philippines, despite 
the difference in outlook on such umbrella clauses expressed by the tribunal, it eventually declined to hear contract- 
based claims on the basis of a separate ground, i.e. admissibility. 
15 See for instance Sornarajah, "A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration", 
Chapter 4 in Sauvant � Chiswick-Patterson (eds.), sura,  footnote 9, at pages 55-56. 
55. International arbitration and other dispute settlement arrangements have replaced these 
older and frequently abusive practices of  the past. These modern developments are essential, 
however, to the protection of the rights envisaged under the pertinent treaties; they are also 
closely linked to the material aspects of  the treatment accorded. Traders and investors, like 
their States of  nationality, have traditionally felt that their rights and interests are better 
protected by recourse to international arbitration than by submission of  disputes to domestic 
courts, while the host governments have traditionally felt that the protection of domestic 
courts is to be preferred. The drafting history of  the ICSID Convention provides ample 
evidence of  the conflicting views of those favoring arbitration and those supporting policies 
akin to different versions of the Calvo Clause. 
56. From the above considerations it can be concluded that if a third party treaty contains provisions for 
the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the protection (2f the investor's rights and interests 
than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the most favored 
rratiorr clause as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis principle. "46 (Emphasis added; 
original footnotes omitted.) 
S o m e  tribunals have shared the above  phi losophy;  examples are those in  Siemens 
A . G .  v. The Argentine Republic and  Gas Natural  SA. v. The Argentine Republic.47 O t h e r  
tribunals w h i c h  have b e e n  sanguine a b o u t  ex t end ing  the  appl icat ion o f  MFN clauses, 
such as those in Suez and Interaguas v. Argentina, and  Suez and �'rcnJt v. Argentina.48 
A n u m b e r  o f  tribunals, h o w e v e r ,  have taken a m o r e  conservat ive v i ew  w i t h  respect  
to such appl icat ion o f M F N  clauses. Examples  inc lude  those in Technicas Medioantbientales 
v. Mexico.,49 Salini Construttori S.p.A.  and Italstrade S.p.A.  v. The Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan,,50 Plama v. Bulgaria,51 Wintersball Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic52 and  TsA 
Spectrutn de Argentina SA v. The Argentine Republic.53 
Despi te  the  op t imism in some  quarters that  "un l ike  w i t h  umbrel la  clauses, arbitral 
.6 Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Arbitration Case No. ARB/97/7, January 25, 
2000. 
17 Respectively: Award of May 25, 2004 in Icsiu Arbitration Case No. ARB/01/7; Award in 1(:six 
Arbitration Case No. ARB/02/8, August 3, 2004; and Decision of the Tribunal in Preliminary Questions of 
Jurisdiction in ICSID Arbitration Case No. Ann/03/10, June 17, 3005. 
rs The awards dealing with this vexed matter are extensively described and discussed elsewhere, and will not 
be recounted here. See for instance: Locknie Hsu, "MFN and Dispute Settlement - When the Twain Meet", (2006) 
Journal of World Investment � Trade, 7:1, 25; Alejandro Faya Rodriguez, "The Most-Favorcd-Nation Clause in 
International Investment Agreements - A Tool for Treaty SHopping?" (2008) Journal of International Arbitration 
25(1): 89-102; Stephan W. Schill, Chapter m, "Multilateralization through Most-Favored-Nation Treatment", in 
"The Multilateralization of  International Investment Law" (2009), Cambridge University Press. See also the 
remarks of  the International Law Commission at: http://untreaty.uii.org/ilc/rcports/201 ()/ctlglisli/chp I l.pdf, 
paras. 366-368; Schill, "Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses", (2009) 
Berkeley Journal of Int'1 L. 496. For an example of divergent views on such application of the MFN clause, see for 
instance: http://www.ejiltalk.org/international-investment-arbitration-poisoned-at-the-root/; Yannick Radi, 
"The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute Settlement Provisions of  Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Domesticating the 'Trojan Horse"', (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 757-74; 
Okczic Chukwumerije, "Interpreting Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses in Investment Treaty Arbitrations", (2007) 
8(5) J. World Inv. � Trade, 597; Stephen Fictta, "Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution under 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?" (2005) Int. A.L.R. 131; and Bridgette Stern, Chapter 18, "1(:SID 
Arbitration and the State's Increasingly Remote Consent: Apropo the Maffezini Case", in Charnovitz, et. al, supra, 
footnote 17. 
.9 Award in ICSID Case No. ARB/ AF/OOI2, May 29, 2003. 
50 Decision on Jurisdiction in ICSID Case No. Aan/02/13,  November 2004. 
51 Decision on Jurisdiction in ICSID Case No. ArtD/03/24, February 8, 2005. 
5= Award in ICSID Case No. ARS/04/14, December 8, 2008. 
53 Award in ICSID Case No. AM/05 /5 ,  December 19, 2008. 
practice [with respect to Mrtv clauses] appears to be evolving towards a consistent 
rule"54, the Maffezini award and its progenys have far from settled on a single, clear rule, 
as the examples below show. 
In 2006, while a majority of the tribunal (comprising Advokat Bengt Sjovall as 
Chairman and Professor Sergei Lebedev) in Berschader and Berschader v. Russian Federation 
declined to apply the MFN provision (despite its broad wording to include "all matters") 
to extend to dispute settlement provisions in another treaty. Referring to the BIT in 
question, the majority also noted: "When the Treaty was concluded in 1989, there was 
no generally accepted approach to the question of  whether an arbitration clause is 
encompassed by an MFN provision. Even today, no such common approach can be 
ascertained. "57 (Emphasis added.) 
In that case, a dissenting opinion on this point was given by Professor Todd Weiler. 
He was unconvinced by the majority's reasoning (seen to be based on Plama) and was 
of the view that the language in the MFN clause should not be read restrictively. 58 
In 2007, the tribunal in Roslnrlest Company UK Limited v. Russian Federation59 
sought to avoid deciding generally whether MFN clauses may "transfer" dispute 
settlement provisions of  other treaties, but, on the basis of  the MFN clause in Article 3(2) 
of the UK-Soviet BIT (the primary BIT from which jurisdiction originated) read in 
conjunction with Article 8 of  another BIT signed by Russia - namely, the Denmark- 
Russia Bur - found that it had jurisdiction extending beyond that granted by Article 8 of 
the UK-Soviet BIT. In other words it was prepared to give the claimant the benefit of 
an extended jurisdiction through the MFN clause. 
In late 2009, another tribunal preferred to take an open view of application of MFN 
clauses to dispute settlement provisions/mechanisms, without adopting either a broad 
or restrictive interpretation of  them. 611 As recently as in June 2011, such strongly divided 
ê  Kohler-Kaufinann, in a 2006 lecture, supra, footnote 15, at page 371. She argued there that the 'rule' was 
that: "MFN clauses can be used to overcome waiting periods and similar admissibility requirements, but not to 
replace, in whole or in part, the dispute resolution mechanism provided by in the treaty upon which jurisdiction 
is based." This is in fact not as clearly established as was she made it out to be, as this part of the article shows. 
'e Ernilio Agustin Maffezirri v. Kingdom oj Spain, ICSID Case Anu/97/7,  Decision of the Tribunal on Objections 
to Jurisdiction, January 25, 2000. For an overview in this area including discussion of some of the "progeny", see 
UNCTAD, "Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review", available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054 en.pdf, at Part II. c. A number of works that examine this area already 
exist; see next footnote. 
56 Award and Correction, Sec Case No. 080/2004, April 21, 2006 (Stockholm). 
s� Ibid., at para. 200. 
58 Ibirl., paras. 15-26. 
s9 Award on Jurisdiction, Scc Case No. V079/2005, October 1, 2007. 
S e e  Austria Airlines v. Slovakia, Final Award, Arl hnc - U n c i t r a l  Arbitration Rules, Award October 9, 
2009, where the tribunal stated at para. 119: "the Tribunal does not consider that provisions that embody a State's 
consent to arbitration must be strictly interpreted. This view, which was adopted by the tribunals in Plama v. 
BuIRaria, 7'eletior v. Hungry, Berschader v. Russia and Wintershall v. Argentina, is not an accurate reflection of 
international law on this matter. As noted in another line of decisions and awards, including Arnro v. Indonesia, 
Mondev v. Llnited States, Suez and Interaguas v. Argentina, and Suez and Vivendi v. Argentina, there is no principle of 
either restrictive or extensive interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate in international law (it being specified that 
this may indeed be different under certain national arbitration laws)." (Original footnotes omitted.) The Tribunal 
was of  the view that "it must interpret Article 3 [the MFN provision] of  the Treaty 'neither restrictively nor 
(footnote continued on next page) 
philosophical views continue to be seen among arbitrators on this very issue in Iiiipregilt) 
S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic.61 
These approaches hardly show that a consolidation has occurred in this area, and 
would, on the contrary, appear therefore to question the optimism mentioned above, 
at least for now. In a very recent case, the majority of the tribunal, in discussing the case 
law on applicability of  MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions, expressed the 
following view and attempted to sort the cases into two types: 
".... the Arbitral Tribunal finds it unfortunate if the assessment of these issues would be in 
each case dependent on the personal opinions of individual arbitrators. The best way to 
avoid such a result is to make the determination on the basis of case law whenever a clear 
case law can be discerned. It is true that, as stated above, the jurisprudence regarding the 
application of MFN clauses to settlement of disputes provisions is not fully consistent. 
Nevertheless, in cases where the MFN clause has referred to "all matters" or "any matter" 
regulated in the BIT, there has been near-unanimity in finding that the clause covered the 
dispute settlement rules. "62 
A recent publication by Professor Zachary Douglas further illustrates the deep 
divisions in this area. In his piece, Professor Douglas launches a spirited and indignant 
attack on tribunals' interpretation of  MFN treatment to include dispute settlement 
processes, arguing strongly against the 'BIT by BIT' approach and mere reliance on text 
for interpretation of such clauses in investment treaties.63 
Underlying these decisions and debates, it is submitted, is again a fundamental 
ideological divide: MFN clauses - unless expressly and clearly worded to extend to 
dispute settlement processes - should not be applied toward such extension. 
4. NECESSITY EXCEPTION 
Another area of  division that has arisen in a number of recent arbitrations is in the 
application of the necessity exception which appears in several investment treaties,.64 
Closely related to this is the meaning of the term "essential interest" which often appears 
in investment treaty language, and the extent to which the exception may apply to 
economic measures taken to deal with serious national economic crises. This 'flashpoint' 
has emerged from a number of  cases involving measures taken by the Argentinian 
expansively but rather objectively and in good £loth'. It must do so in accordance with the usual rules of  treaty- 
interpretation set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, taking into account inter alia the wording of Article 3 of 
the Treaty, its context, the object and purpose of  the Treaty, as well as the relevant supplementary means of 
interpretation." This suggests that the Tribunal would in a suitable case have been open to an "import" of another 
treaty's dispute settlement provisions had the good faith interpretation permitted it. On the facts, it found that Art. 3 
did not permit such a reading. 
61 ICSID Case No, Ann/07/17, Award dated June 21, 2011, at para. 108. See also the strong dissenting view 
of arbitrator Brigitte Stem on the MFN issues. 
hz Award of the majority, ibid. 
6.' Zachary Douglas, "The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails", 
(2011) Vol. 2 No. 1, Joumal of International Dispute Settlement, 97-113. The views expressed by Professor Douglas 
are very interesting and would merit fuller discussion in a separate, subsequent piece. 
64 See William W. Burke-White, "The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BiTs and the 
Legitimacy of the Icsii) System", Chapter 17 in "The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration", supra, footnote 1. 
government in response to the debt crisis facing it in the early part of the last decade. 
Again, these cases have shown divergent and strong opinions on the necessity exception. 
These, it is submitted, illustrate yet another area of  strong underlying division of thought 
among arbitrators. 
The necessity exception was pleaded by Argentina in LG�E v. Argentina, Enron v. 
Argentina, Sempra v. Argentina, Cms v. Argentina, Continental Casualty v. Argentina, and 
Nationnl Grid v. Argentina.65 The necessity defence failed in all but one of  these cases, 
succeeding in the LG�E case. O f  the cases in which it failed, two of the awards have since 
been annulled under the ICSID annulment procedure by an ad hoc Annulment Committee. 
These are the Cnts and Sempra awards. A third award - that from the Continental Casualty 
arbitration - was facing annulment proceedings at the time of writing.66 
This series of cases is ground-breaking in that they explore in some detail for the 
first time and in the investment arbitration arena, the necessity defence. While necessity 
has been examined elsewhere by the International Court of Justice (Icj), these cases 
provide interpretations in the context of investment treaty language instead of  purely 
under customary international law. In other words, the necessity exception in these 
cases arose because of  specific treaty provisions. However, in interpreting the scope and 
applicability o f  the treaty article on necessity, some tribunals conflated the necessity 
provision with the customary international law interpretation of 'necessity' as set out in 
Article 25 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
for International Wrongful Acts. 
Annulment of the Crvis, Sempra and Enron Cases and the Non-Annulment irt Continental 
Casualty 
The Enron Annulment Committee proceeded to annul the award on the ground 
that the tribunal had demonstrated a "manifest excess of powers" under Article 52(1)(b) 
of  the ICSID Convention, by failing to apply the applicable law (Article XI of  the Bur).�� 
The tribunal in Continental Casualty, on the other hand, tended to adopt a broader 
perspective in interpreting the BIT necessity provision. It even made reference to WTO 
decisions on the meaning and scope of "necessity" in the context of Gn'r'r Article XX 
which contains some exceptions incorporating the word "necessary". 
Some salient points of divergence of  views appear to relate to: 
-  The relationship and appropriate order of argument between the BIT necessity 
15 Rcspcctively, ICSID Arbitration No. Antt/02/1, ICSID Arbitration No. AIZB/Ol/3, Icsid Arbitration 
No. AR.B/02/16. ICSID Arbitration No. AI�.H/Ol/8 and ICSID Arbitration No. AKB/03/9, and UNCITRAL, Award 
dated 3 November 2008. 
66 See summary of proceedings at ICSID website as at 22 August 2011: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=CxsesRH�reqFrom=ListCases�caseld=C13�actionVal=viewCase. The Annulment 
Committee rejected Argentina's request for annulment relating to the necessity issue on September 16, 2011. 1.
11 Para. 378 of  the Decision. The Committee also considered the ground of annulment relating to a failure 
to state reasons; see para. 378 of the Decision. 
provision and customary international law necessity, and the interpretation of 
a I3IT necessity provision in light of  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VcLT). The Annulment Decisions in Sempra v. Argentina 
and in Enron v. Argentina, and their original arbitration awards, and the 
Contirventnl Casualty v. Argentina Award illustrate the fundamentally different 
approaches that exist. 
— A parenthetical question, for most part not debated in the recent Argentinian 
awards and Annulment Decisions, as to whether the ILC Draft Articles 
represent customary international law on necessity, so as to govern even a 
specific treaty provision on necessity. The parties and tribunals agreed in CMS 
v. Argentina, Sempra v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina and most recently, in 
Impregilo v. Argentina?* that the Articles 'reflected' customary international 
law, but two Annulment Committees appear to have left this open.69 A related 
question is what forms the primary and secondary rules, as envisaged under the 
ILC Draft Articles. The tribunal in Continental Casualty v. Argentina attempted 
to make this analysis.71) 
-  Interpretation and application of the criteria for 'necessity' under customary 
international law/Article 25 ILC Draft Articles, such as the meaning of a 
measure having to be the "only way", and what amounts to "safeguarding an 
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril", and finally, what 
amounts to a "contribution" by the state to the emergency so as to negate the 
necessity defence.71 
-  Whether  a necessity treaty provision is self-judging.72 
D. YWLICYMAKERS' DILEMMA AND INVESTORS' QUESTIONS 
While academics and arbitrators continue to wrestle with interpretative divisions 
such as those mentioned above, policymakers and investors are searching for some 
certainty and understanding of  the legal landscape and its effects on potential and actual 
disputes they may have under investment treaty claims. What are some issues and 
strategies they may confront in light of this situation? 
i. You WiN SOME, You LOSE SomE? 
The current state of  matters produces disquiet not only for those advising host states 
68 ICSIIJ Case No. ARD/07/17. 
s9 Note, however, that the Argentina-Italy BIT under exarnination in Impregilo did not contain a specific 
'necessity' provision, unlike the US-Argentina BIT which contained such a provision in Article xr. On the 
Annulment references, see para. 168 of the Sempra Annulment Decision and para. 356, Enron Annulment Decision. 
'° See Award, supra, footnote 65, at para. 134. 
71 See Enron Annulment Decision, paras. 385-393. 
'= See for instance the Sempra Annulment Decision. Note that Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT does not 
contain the words "it considers". For a discussion of the `self-judging' nature of such provisions and a brief 
comparison with other related exceptions, see Hsu, "2000-2009: A Decade of Security-Related Developments in 
Trade and Development", October 2010, 11:5, Journal of  World Investment � Trade, 697, at pp. 721-2. 
but also those advising investors. To the extent that a treaty provision's interpretation is 
uncertain until laid down by the tribunal, both sides share 'equal misery' in that sense. 
On  the other hand, to take a 'glass half full' perspective, given that the tribunal in 
question may depart from a prior award's stance, the door to succeeding in the dispute 
remains open until shut by the actual decision. In more specific terms, the stated 
policymakers face a dilemma of whether their interpretations of jurisdiction and 
substance will be accepted; the investor faces questions such as whether to bring a claim 
to BIT arbitration, the costs and the likelihood of success. An issue common to both 
which has a significant bearing on the claim will be the composition of the tribunal itself. 
This is not to say that arbitrators are not impartial; rather they may hold certain views 
on the purpose and utilization of certain investment treaty provisions. 
One of the hallmarks of arbitration is the availability of choice of arbitrators, this 
choice must now be taken even more seriously and carefully, now that ideological 
divisions on various legal issues - such as those mentioned above - have emerged. Good 
arbitrators will impartially examine the available evidence and facts and make decisions 
using these. However it is neither unethical nor inappropriate for an arbitrator to hold 
certain views. Indeed, many arbitrators - besides doubling as counsel in other cases - 
also wear academic hats. Given this confluence of  roles, it is inevitable that arbitrators 
hold certain ideologies. Taking this to a higher level of  abstraction, as you consent to 
investor-State arbitration, so must you live with the risk of losing in a given case. In this 
regard, even national systems present similar assumptions; in those cases there is not even 
the initial choice of the decision-maker, i.e., the judge, who is state-assigned. If of  
course one took the view of Mr Jan Paulsson, one would hope that the 'fittest' of  
decisions would persist and come to be adopted eventually as the consensus view. 73 
ii. THE POLICYAL4KERS' DILF.MMA 
In the global competition for foreign direct investment, BITs and F'rAS containing 
investment protection provisions can be policy tools for attracting such investment. The 
legal and remedial protection afforded directly to foreign investors (as defined by the 
treaties) provide comfort and in many cases, real, monetary remedies, for actions taken 
by a host State in contravention of  treaty obligations. 
The policymaker negotiating a Bor/F'rn therefore needs to provide sufficient 
assurance to the trade and investment partner so as to make the provisions attractive to 
its investors. At the same time there needs to be a balance in the extent and type of  
protection. At the negotiating table therefore a fine line needs to be drawn so that a host 
State does not excessively promise protections it does not wish or intend to extend. 
Bargaining power and an understanding of  implications o f  potential treaty 
interpretations play a part in settling where that line is eventually drawn. Given the fact 
that tribunals may or may not 'follow' prior interpretations, this author submits that real 
73 Supra, f oo tno t e  11.  .
control against a lack of  predictability (as argued by writers advocating de facto stare decisis 
in the current situation) is in the hands of policymakers at the negotiating table. To the 
extent that scope and limitations to a treaty provision are clearly spelt out, to that extent 
could ambiguity - and therefore unpredictability at the dispute settlement stage - be 
removed or, at least, substantially reduced. Indeed, some states have taken steps to 
attempt to clarify their provisions. 
This recent statement by a Singapore official gives a rare glimpse into the mind of 
the policymaker and illustrates the dilemma: 
"One of the perennial issues we face in negotiating FTns and BiTs relates to the scope of the 
MFN obligation. In particular, we face considerable uncertainty regarding the interpretation 
of this clause, given the differing approaches towards these clauses by dispute settlement 
bodies, in particular investor-State arbitration tribunals, in the last 10 years. The most 
notorious case is undoubtedly the Maffezini decision. While we recognise that the case 
involved a loosely worded MFN clause, and that the weight of tribunal decisions in the last 
few years, led by Salini and Plama cases, appears to have rejected that decision, there remain 
a handful of cases which have followed the Maffezini decision. As such, an undesirable level 
of uncertainty still surrounds the ambit of this clause, especially in the area of trade in 
services and investments. To manage this uncertainty, countries have attempted to insert language 
in the investment related provisions of their FTAS to specify that procedural rights do not,fall within the 
ambit of the MFN clause. Flowever, it remains to be seen whether tribunals will interpret this provision 
in the intended manner."1* (Emphasis added.) 
One reality that also needs to be taken into account in this discussion is that host 
states negotiate the terms of treaties with other states and not with private investors.75 
This means that the negotiations will have to take into account their political 
relationship and attendant considerations. Such considerations may help shape the type 
of investors and investments that will be allowed to enjoy the various types of protection 
and access to investor-state arbitration under the treaty. 
In light of the many tribunal remarks available, various clarifications can be made 
by host governments in such negotiations.76 
74 Statement by Mr Lionel Yee, Director-General, International Law Division, Attorney-General's Chambers 
of  Singapore, speaking on the International Law Commission's Report on Chapters X, xr and XII on the work of 
its 62nd session, Sixth Committee, 1 November 2010, at: http://app.tiifa.gov.sg/pr/read cotiteiit.asp?View,l 15394. 
For the part of the Report on MFN clauses, see: http://untrcaty.un.org.ilc/reports/2010/english/chpl l.pdf 
�s Patrick Juillard argued as follows: "BITS were originally intended to restore a favorable climate for North- 
South investment. This could be done only by creating conditions that would encourage rather than discourage 
investors. BITS, therefore, rested upon a quid quo pro which certain commentator considered as imbalanced - though 
the adjective "asymmetric" would seem more appropriate. A host country offers favorable conditions of treatment and 
protection, while the country of origin undertakes to promote investment by its nationals into the host country. This 
do ut des does not involve investors. Investors, therefore, assume no responsibility, if for no other reason than that they 
were not parties to BITS, which is in the nature of c o n t r a c t  between sovereign States"; Chapter 5, "Variation in the 
Substantive Provisions and Interpretation of International Investment Agreements", at pages 82-82, in "Appeals 
Mechanism in International Investment Arbitration", ed. Karl P. Sauvant, with Michael Chiswick-Patterson, 2008, 
Oxford University Press. 
�6 See for instance suggestions by Van Hanen, supra, footnote 33: 
"On the rules, govemments could clarity that investment treaties are designed to offer an exceptional remedy in cases of 
serious abuse or tarqeted discrimination against aforeigii investor, but not a wide-ranging opportunity to clialletigegetieril 
laws and policies. Nearly all government measures harm some people while helping others, not because this 
is the aim of the regulation but because all general decisions, by definition, have ripple effects across the {J..'_.L._�- -.....:....-.1 0-- U u." -...--\ 
Two recent examples illustrate treaty-makers' responses to the MFN-dispute 
settlement issue discussed above. In the first, the Singapore-Costa Rica Free Trade 
Agreement ("CRSFTA"), the two states have included the following express limitation 
in the MFN provision of  the treaty: 
"For greater certainty, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not be construed as granting to 
investors mechanisms or procedures for the settlement of disputes other than those set out 
in Article 11.16 (Investor-State Dispute S e t t l e m e n t  
In the second and more recent agreement, the Malaysia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement ("MNZFTA"), an express limitation has also been inserted in the MFN 
provision: 
"For greater certainty, the obligation in this Article does not encompass a requirement to 
extend to the other Party dispute resolution procedures other than those set out in this 
Chapter."71 
These two provisions show the practical steps taken and caution being exercised by 
states so as to avoid debate such as that arising in Maffezini and other disputes. 
Other suggestions to increase certainty for states in their investment treaty 
commitments include: 
On  jurisdictional safeguards - 
-  Having explicit 'denial of benefits' clauses; in Tokio Tokeles, for instance, the 
majority in the arbitral tribunal found the absence of such a clause in the 13�'r 
in question between Ukraine and Lithuania to be highly r e l e v a n t  
-  Ensuring that eligibility provisions are clear, as to investors, investments 
eligible for protection, instead of the usual 'boilerplate', standard provisions we 
see in many Bi'rs that do not explicitly exclude for instance investments in 
reality made by home state nationals or third party nationals; 
O n  substantive safeguards - 
-  Strengthening and clarifying exception clauses, such as by spelling out 
situations where the host State may be permitted to take measures to protect 
public interests whether in relation to human health, environmental safety or 
any identifiable areas that the government wishes to have protection in; and 
-  Including explicit provisions on what may not be treated as indirect or 
creeping expropriation. 
economy and society. Requiring public compensation for those foreign investors who are "harnied" by a 
general measure skews markets, as well as regulation, by inappropriately privileging one group of private 
interests over all others." (Italics added.) 
77 Article 11.5(3). Full text of the treaty (signed on 6 April 2010, expected to enter into force in 2011) is 
available at: http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta C-crsfta.asp?lil=32. 
78 Article 10.5(2). Full text of the treaty [in force as of July 2010) is available at: http://www.mfat.govt.nz/ 
Trade-and-Econonvc-Relations/Trade-Relationships-and-Agrecments/Malaysia/index.php#text. t.
�9 See para. 36 of the Award, supra, footnote 35. 
H o w  then may states deal with the current situation, faced with persistent areas of  
deep divergence such as those discussed above? 
While it is probably easier to make adjustments for new agreements, the question 
remains as to how to deal with existing agreements already signed. According to 
UNCTAD figures, the number of BITS alone (excluding FTA investment provisions) is 
close to 3,000. It would be no mean feat to reopen or renegotiate many of these 
agreements. 
At the same time, it should not be assumed that developing-country host states sign 
or negotiate investment or related treaties without full understanding or little bargaining 
power. Poverty and a lack of legal resources are certainly still very much present in many 
host states. The world of the 21 st century is, however, most certainly not the world that 
existed in the 1960s (or even the 1980s) when less recent BITS were entered into. It is a 
different world institutionally, technologically, economically and politically. Host states 
come in all shapes and sizes, ranging from the US to China. Institutions such as (but not 
limited to) the W o o  and UNCTAD provide capacity-building in international trade and 
investment law and policy across a wide spectrum of  areas. Technology has led to much 
greater global connectivity, which has in turn allowed many developing countries to 
locate important information, case law and materials to assist them in negotiations. In 
addition, several capital-importing states are now significant capital-exporting states, and 
foreign direct investment outflows in 2009 from developing countries amounted to 
US$229 billion.80 While these states form a relatively small number among developing 
states, there are indications that other states may be moving in the same direction.81 As 
such states increase their capital export, treaty positions resulting from past imbalances 
or asymmetries will change alongside this. 
8I) See China Ministry of Commerce website post, "China's Direct Investment Abroad Expected to Break 
through USD100b by 2013", 3 Sep 2010, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/coml110nnews/ 
201009/20100907117824.html; and UtVCrnD's World Investment Report 2010, especially pages 6-7, available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid=13423�intltemlD=2068�lang=1�mode=downloads. The 
Report states at page 6: 
"Developing and transition economies' economic growth, the rise of their Tr·rcs and growing competitive 
pressure at home have supported an expansion in their foreign investment. Added to the uneven regional 
impact of the recent global crisis on outward foreign investment, this has pushed the share of developing 
and transition economies in global Fm outflows to a record high. Other than the British Virgin Islands, which 
is one of the tax haven economies, three oflhe economies (China, Hong Kong (China) and the Russian Federation) are 
among the top 20 investors in the world .... [Transnational corporations] from two of these economies, namely 
China and the Russian Federation, plus India and Brazil - also referred to collectively as B l u e  -  have 
become dynamic investors ... Outflows from developing and transition economies, however, remain well 
below their share of Fm inflows...." (Italics added.) 
It further states at page 23: 
"The growing role of developing economies as sources of  FDt is confirmed by investment promotion 
agencies (IpAs) surveyed in the WI!'" about the most promising investors in their respective countries. While 
developed economies still account for the majority of Fm sources mentioned by IPAS, developing and 
transition economies account for three out of the top ten ... and seven out of the top twenty." (Wips stands for the 
World Investment Prospects Survey.) (Italics added.) 
See also generally, Clarence Kwan and Karl P. Sauvant, "Chinese Foreign Investment in the United States 
- Challenges Ahead", at http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/LocationUSAarticle.pdf. 
81 The Report highlights in chapter 1 that the most significant Fm outflows are from "Bpic"  -  Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China. In chapter 2 (pages 47-49), it highlights Latin American corporations going global as well. Page 30 
of the Report shows not insubstantial FDI outflows from East Asian, South Asian and Southeast Asian states as a whole. 
Apart from the possibility of renegotiation -  which some states have d o n e  -  
another is to review one's model B�'r. The US Model BIT, formulated as recently as in 
2004, for instance, is already under review at the moment.82 Other countries have also 
been reviewing their BiTs, with some having expressed the intention to cancel existing 
Bits.83 China, emerging as a large capital exporter in this decade, is a developing host 
state which has a Model BIT. In fact, the current Model Bm which was fonnulated in 
the 1990s, is the third iteration. The draft new Model BIT in China may well include 
new provisions that address some host state concerns.84 
A more draconian step for host states that are dissatisfied with the investment 
arbitration system of ICSID would be to denounce participation in ICSID altogether, as 
has been done by Bolivia in 2007 and by Ecuador in 2009.s5 There have also been cases 
of denunciation of Bits.86 
Other 'remedial' - and less drastic - state actions post-award include the issuing of  
interpretative notes,87 effecting a change in language in existing BITS,88 review of  
'model' BITS,By and inclusion of specific interpretative instruments alongside new 
treaties to guide their interpretation more c l o s e l y  
111. INVESTORS' Ques t ions  
On  one hand, the advantages of investor-State arbitration are evident to investors: 
independent and impartial adjudicators, choice of adjudicators, venue and rules (to the 
extent permitted by the relevant treaty) and possibly a speedier outcome than in some 
e= See 2009 Report of the US Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy, Investment 
Subcommittee: http: //www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/131098.htm; see Elizabeth Whitsitt, "United States 
Trade Representative and State Department hold Public Hearing and Solicit Written Comments in US Model BIT 
Review", 2 September 2009, http://www.nsd.org/itn/2009/09/01/united-states-trade-representative-and-state- 
department-hold-public-hearing-and-solicit-written-comments-in-us-modcl-bit-review/. 
s3 See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010, supra, footnote 80, at pages 85-86. For discussions on various 
aspects of international investment arbitration that have developed recently, see "The Backlash Against Investment 
Arbitration", sura,  footnote 1. 
11 See Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, "Chinese Investment Treaties - Policies and Practice", 2009, 
Oxford University Press, especially chapter 9. 
es See for instance: http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/08/28/ecuador-prepares-for-lifc-aftcr-icsid-while-debate- 
continues-over-efFect-of-its-exit-from-the-centre/. 
86 See UNCTAD. IIA Monitor No. 3 (2009), "Recent Developments in International Investment Agreement 
(2008-June 2009), at pages 5-6, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf. See also 
Salacuse, supra, footnote 2, at page 469. 
87 See for instance the NAFTA Trade Commission's Note on Interpretation issued shortly after S.D. Myers and 
Mondcv awards, on the standard of fair and equitable treatment and its interpretation vis-a-vis customary 
international law. See C. Schreuer, "Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment 
Arbitration, supra, footnote 8, Part m, for a brief discussion of such notes and other mechanisms which are 
'institutionalized'. 
88 Switzerland, for instance, has made changes to its BIT provisions subsequent to the Maffezini award 
(discussed above): see Andreas R. Ziegler, "The Nascent International Law on Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) 
Treatment Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS)", Christoph Hemiann and Jorg Philipp Terhechte, 
European Yearbook on International Economic Law, Vol. 1, 2010, at p. 94, text accompanying footnote 68. 
t h e  US for instance is currently reviewing its 2004 Model BIT. 
S e e  for example the several 'side letters' appended to the US-Singapore FTA (which contains a chapter on 
Investments and an investor-State arbitration mechanism), including one resembling the NAFTA interpretative note 
of 2001, supra, footnote 87. For examples of  protocols on amendments to existing EU agreements and 
renegotiations, see UNCTAD, LA Monitor No. 3 (2009), supra, footnote 86, at pages 5-6. 
national adjudicatory systems. On  the other, the investor's protection is limited to the 
following: 
-  treaty provisions; 
-  interpretation of the scope and violation of these provisions; and 
-  the arbitral tribunal's view (ideological) of those interpretations. 
The word "limited" is used deliberately as some may have an impression that BITS 
tend to provide broad (almost boundless) protection of  investors' rights and of their 
investments. While this may well be true of some treaty provisions, provisions at the 
cusp between clarity and ambiguity also exist, and these will have to pass through the 
interpretative and ideological sieve of arbitrators. 
One question that the investor potentially faces is how particular investment treaty 
provisions will be interpreted. This is a question whose answer may change from the 
time the investment is made to the time of actual dispute settlement. At the former time, 
the investor may be basing his investment decisions on existing interpretations by other 
tribunals, to the extent he trusts those to be representative of prevailing views. Where 
there are conflicting views, his question would be which to consider a more likely one 
to arise in case of a dispute. At the latter time, he is, through counsel, trying to predict 
the interpretation that will be taken by the selected arbitrators. By this time their 
identities will be known, as may be any ideological predispositions.91 
This is not to say that arbitrators who articulated certain views are necessarily biased 
or cannot decide differently from those views in a given case.92 
The question was thrown into sharp relief recently in Urbaser SA and Consorcio de 
Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia ur Partzuergoa v. Argentina, where an arbitrator's 
views on MFN provisions expressed in a scholarly work came to the fore.�3 Two tribunal 
members were called upon to determine if objections to the selection of the third 
arbitrator (in substitution o f  a member who had passed away after appointment) was 
independent and impartial, given that he had expressed certain views on relevant issues 
in an earlier academic work. Recognizing that while "it is correct to say that a scholar's 
opinion might change and is unrelated to the pattern of  facts and arguments related to 
a particular case, Claimants are right to the extent that they argue that such opinion may 
nevertheless be a factor of influence when it comes to considering the same or similar issues 
9� In a recent case, Urbaser v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARJ3/07/26, Decision on Claimant's Request 
to Disqualify an Arbitrator, August 12, 2010, one of the arbitrators (Sir Ian Brownlie) passed away after 
appointment, and a substitute arbitrator had to be selected. Argentina selected Professor Campbell McLachlan, and 
the award states at para. 20, with respect to the claimants' objections to this choice under Art. 57 of the ICSID 
Convention: "Claimants' proposal for the disqualification of Prof McLachlan as an arbitrator and member of this 
Tribunal is based on views expressed by Prof McLachlan in his publications as a legal scholar on two questions that 
Claimants consider crucial to this arbitration." Part of this objection related to Professor McLachlan's reference to 
the Maffezitzijurisdiction decision as being "heretical" (paras. 21-23 of the award). The other objection related to 
his expressed views on arbitrations on the 'necessity' exception. 
92 See Schneider, supra, footnote 3, where he discusses the "attitudinal model" relating to the legal preferences 
o fUS Supreme Court justices, studied by Segal and Spaeth. 
93 Supra, footnote 91. 
in a particular dispute. In other words a legal scholar who becomes an 7cMD arbitrator does not 
lose his /her capacity of being a scholar that conveys academic opinions, which might become relevant 
to the legal analysis undertaken in the resolution of a particular dispute."�� (Emphasis added.)  
T h e  m e m b e r s  fur ther  expla ined as follows: 
"... No arbitrator and, more generally, no human being of  a certain age is, in absolute terms, 
independent and impartial. Simply put, every individual is conveying ideas and opinions 
based on its moral, cultural, and professional education and experience. What is required, 
when it comes to rendering judgment  in a legal dispute, is the ability to consider and 
evaluate the merits of  each case without relaying on factors having no relation to such merits."9s 
T a k i n g  a pragmat ic  approach,  they  fur ther  opined:  
"45. The Two Members seized with the challenge submitted by Claimants are of  the view 
that the mere slrowing of arr opinion, even if relevant in a particular arbitration, is not sufficient to 
sustain a challenge for lack of independence or impartiality of an arbitrator. For such a challenge to 
succeed there must be a snowing that such opinion or position is supported by factors related to and 
supporting a party to the arbitration (or a party closely related to such party), by a direct or indirect 
interest of the arbitrator in the outcome of the dispute, or by a relationship with any other individual 
involved, such as a witness orfellow arbitrator. 
46. Indeed if one would prefer to extend such requirement of  independence or impartiality 
beyond this framework, as supported by Claimants, the mere fact of having made known an 
opinion on an issve relevant in nn arbitration world have the effect of allowing a challenge for lack of 
independence or impartiality. Such a position, however, would have effects reaching far beyond 
what Claimants seem to sustain, and incompatible with the proper functioning of  the 
arbitral system under the ICSID Convention. 
47. The opinions expressed by Prof. McLachlan are those of an academic. T7iey represent, even when 
taken together with numerous other opinions expressed by scholars, a small part of all opinions contained 
in publications relating to arbitrations governed by the ICSID Convention. 
48. If Claimants' view were to prevail and any opinion previously expressed on certain 
aspects of  the ICSID Convention be considered as elements of prejudgment in a particular 
case because they might become relevant or are merely argued by one party, the consequence 
would be that no potential arbitrator of an ICSID Tribunal would ever express views on any such matter, 
whether it may be procedural, jurisdictional, or touching upon the substantive rights deriving from Brrs. 
The wide spreading of ICSID awards through publication and appearance on the Centre's 
website has greatly contributed to dense exchanges of  views throughout the world on 
matters of  international investment law. This is very largely considered as a positive 
contribution to the development of  the law and policies in this segment of  the world's 
economy. It goes without saying that such a debate would be fruitless if it did not include 
an exchange of  opinions given by those who are actually involved in the ICSID arbitration 
process, whether they are writing and speaking as scholars, arbitrators, or counsel. Such 
activity is part of  the "system" and well known to all concerned. Therefore, it seems 
extremely strange to the T w o  Members to accept Claimants' position that a view previously 
expressed on an item relevant in an arbitral proceeding should be qualified as a prejudgment 
that demonstrates a lack o f  independence or impartiality.... 
54 . . . .  ff Claimants' challenge would be upheld on the basis of the challenged statements made by 
Prof. McLachlan, nearly all arbitrators who have ever expressed an opinion on an item specific to ICSID 
U r b a s e r  Decision, para. 52. 
.5 Urbaser Decision, para. 40. 
arbitration would be at risk of a challenge. Such an approach would lead to the disgualification of as 
many arbitrators, including in particular those who have acquired the greatest experience, thus leading 
to the paralysis of the ICSID arbitral process. Such a perspective cannot be even an implicit outcome of 
the decision to be taken by the Two Members of this Tribunal."96 (Emphasis added.) 
The members therefore dismissed the claimants' objections to Professor 
MacLachlan's appointment. The final award in this dispute has not yet become available 
at the time of writing, and the views of this tribunal on the MFN issue are therefore not 
known yet. For an investor, this decision shows that tribunals may be reluctant to find 
a lack of independence or impartiality based merely on views stated by an appointee in 
prior academic writings. The reasons above seemed to be based largely on pragmatic 
considerations since experienced and knowledgeable investment arbitrators form a 
limited pool of persons who need to be called upon to deal with various disputes. To 
sum up, therefore, finding an arbitrator who has previously expressed a particular view 
in an academic work (a) is no bar to his appointment; (b) may see his previous views as 
an "influencing factor"; but (c) is also no guarantee that he will take a particular decision 
on the given facts and treaty provisions he is asked to decide a specific dispute on. It also 
means that despite (d), existing fault lines may yet show up in the final decision, 
depending on the facts/language to be interpreted. 
E. CONCLUSION - CA VEA T Sf.7B.SC�PrOR? 
Ideas have been suggested to deal with the perceived problems arising from a lack 
of  a system of  precedents in investment treaty arbitrations. These include instituting an 
appeal mechanism for institutional arbitrations (such as ICS�n),9� to provide some 
certainty and 'correction' of legal interpretations, much like what the WTO Appellate 
Body is said to provide. Interestingly, the Appellate Body recently made a 
'pronouncement' on how WTO panels should deal with the Appellate Body's prior 
decisions.9R 
11 Urbaser Decision, paras. 45-48, and 54. There is similar thinking in the realm of private, commercial 
arbitrations; see for example Leon Trakman, "The Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators Reconsidered", 
(2007) Vol. 10 Int. A.L.R. 999, available at: http://Iaw.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027�context= 
unswwps and http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfi11?abstract_id=981 085�. 
9� See e.g. "Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes", Karl P. Sauvant (ed.) Michael 
Chiswick-Patterson, 2008. 
ys US-Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R,  Appellate Body Report 
adopted February 19, 2009, at para. 362: "Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB are binding and must be 
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the particular dispute. The Appellate Body has also said that adopted 
panel and Appellate Body reports create legitimate expectations among WTO Members and, therefore, should be 
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. Following the Appellate Body's conclusions in earlier 
disputes is not only appropriate, it is what would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same. 
This is also in line with a key objective of  the dispute settlement system to provide security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system. The Appellate Body has further explained that adopted panel and Appellate Body 
reports become part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute settlement system and that "ensuring 'security and 
predictability' in the dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of  the Dsu, implies that, absent 
cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case." 
Moreover, referring to the hierarchical structure contemplated in the Dsu, the Appellate Body reasoned in 
US-Stainless Steel (Mexico) that the "creation of the Appellate Body by W't'o Members to review legal 
interpretations developed by panels shows that Members recognized the importance of consistency and stability in 
the interpretation of their rights and obligations under the covered agreements." The Appellate Body found that 
Other ideas are to read into the realm of investment decision-making, a de_ facto stare 
decisis practice, or to require states to negotiate clearer terms as suit them in their 
investment treaties to avoid conflicts and inconsistencies. 
While these are not without merit, they are, for now, unable to 'cure' the 
symptoms we are witnessing of some deep ideological divisions emerging among 
arbitrators. Such divisions are not necessarily inherently 'good' or 'bad' but represent 
different starting points of thinking. To quote another writer: "In the absence of  a 
centralized and supreme law-making agency for the international law of investment 
claims, a free and fair battle of ideas is the only way to achieve coherency in the law and 
the sustainability of the system. "99 However, as has been argued here, the divisions in 
opinion in certain areas may in fact militate against such coherency, or a jurisprudence 
constante. 
In the meantime, consent, the cornerstone of arbitration, opens the door to 
divergences in interpretation which reflect arbitral tribunals' convictions over emerging 
legal issues in a range of contexts. Where such consent is given, in the absence of a 
supreme, appellate or codifying authority therefore, it behooves the state, investors and 
arbitrators alike to be aware o f  areas of  consensus and areas of obvious divergence in 
ideology, and to act according to that knowledge. Even as this is being written, disputes 
raising some of  the issues mentioned in this article continue to surface; in an ICSID 
arbitration claim filed in February 2010, a private investor has once again raised the 
Maffezini-MFN type of argument to overcome an 18-month waiting period prior to 
international arbitration, stipulated in the relevant BIT.100 This, and other arbitrations, 
will continue to be watched closely by host governments, investment arbitration 
counsel, arbitrators and academics alike, as more unfolds in the continuing "battle of 
ideas". 
failure by the panel in that case to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues 
undermined the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence clarifying Members' rights and 
obligations under the covered agreements as contemplated under the Dsu. The Appellate Body added that: 
"Clarification, as envisaged in Article 3.2 of  the Dsu, elucidates the scope and meaning of  the provisions 
of the covered agreements in accordance with customary rules of  interpretation of public international law. 
While the application of a provision may be regarded as confined to the context in which it takes place, 
the relevance of clarification contained in adopted Appellate Body reports is not limited to the application 
of  a particular provision in a specific case...." 
Note that Art. 3.2 of the WT(.J,s Dispute Settlement Understanding specifically entrusts the WTO dispute 
settlement system - comprising the Dispute Settlement Body, panels and the Appellate Body - with the specific 
task of ensuring "security and predictability" for the multilateral trading system. 
99 Zachary Douglas, Preface, page xxiv, "The International Law of  Investment Claims", Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. (The work endeavors to 'codify a specialist domain of international law that is at a nascent 
stage of development and that is barely idle for an instant", recognizing that the 'rules' stated therein may not be 
"definitive or complete or even free from error", but could contribute to debate leading to "natural selection".) 
T h e  case raises the Maffezini type of argument under the Swiss-Uruguay BIT; see F1'R Holding S.A. 
(Switaerland) et. al. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Request for Arbitration dated 19 February 2010, available at: 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PMI-UruguayNoA.pdf. 
